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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Statutory jurisdiction is conferred upon this Court because
this is an appeal from the judgment of a district court over
which

the

Court

jurisdiction.

of Appeals

does

not

have

original

appellate

Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-2-2 (3) (j) ; 78-2a-3

(Supp.

1990) .
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
1.

Was Section 78-14-5 (4) (b) Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as

amended, improperly construed and applied by the lower court in
its conclusion of law that the consent executed by Plaintiff's
wife was proper when Plaintiff was capable of giving such consent
himself and when Plaintiff had previously refused to execute the
consent?

2.

Assuming that the lower court's construction of Section

78-14-5-(4)(b) was proper, is said statute unconstitutional

as

applied in this case in that it denies Plaintiff due process and
the right to privacy as guaranteed by Article I Sections 7 and 27
of

the

Utah

Constitution

cind

Amendment

14,

Section

1

and

fundamental penumbra rights of the United States Constitution?
3.

Did the lower court improperly determine that Section

78-14-5(1) precluded Plaintiff's cause of action for common law
battery?
4.

Is Section

78-14-5(1)

unconstitutional

as applied

in

this case in that it denies Plaintiff a remedy for common law
battery, denies Plaintiff due process and denies Plaintiff equal
protection of the law as guaranteed under Article I, Sections 7,
11 and 24 of the Utah Constitution and Amendment 14, Section 1 of
the United States Constitution?
Since all of the above issues prevented for review are based
upon conclusions of law, the appropriate standard of review is
that

the

particular

lower

court's

deference

and

conclusion
should

be

should
reviewed

be

accorded

no

for

correctness.

Asay v. Watkins, 751 P.2d 1135 (Utah 1988); Scharf v. BMG Corp.,
700 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 1985).

Further, the order dismissing

the case was essentially a directed verdict based on proffered
evidence.

Thus, this Court must examine that evidence in a light

most favorable to Plaintiff and if there is a reasonable basis in
the evidence, and in the inferences to be drawn therefrom, that

2

would support a judgment in favor of Plaintiff, the final order
of the lower court must be reversed.

Management Committee of

Greystone. Pines Homeowners Assn. v. Greystone Pines, Inc., 6 52
P.2d 896, 897-98 (Utah 1982).
TEXT OF AUTHORITIES
1

U.S. Const, amend. XIV, § 1.
All pe rsons born or naturalized in the United
States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are
citizens of the United States and the State wherein
they reside, No State shall make or enforce any law
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of
citizens of the United States; nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law; or deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws.

2.

Utah Const, art. I, § 7.
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or
property, without due process of law.

3.

Utah Const, art. I, § 11.
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an
injury done to him in his person, property or
reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law,
which
shall
be
administered
without
denial
or
unnecessary delay; and no person shall be barred from
prosecuting or defending before any tribunal in this
State, by himself or counsel, any civil cause to which
he is a party.

4.

Utah Const, art. J, § 24.
All laws of a general nature shall have uniform
operation.

5.

Utah Const, art. I, § 27.
Frequent recurrence to fundamental principles is
essential to the security of individual rights and the
perpetuity of free government.

-*

6.

Utah Code Ann, § 78-14-5

(1987).

(Set forth verbatim

in

Addendum [hereinafter "A."] 1-3),
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Plaintiff brought this action for battery against Defendant
related to back surgery performed by Defendant on Plaintiff on
May 15, 1987.
without

his

Plaintiff alleges that such surgery was performed
consent,

therefore, he

that

is entitled

Defendant's battery.

the

surgery

to general

Complaint, tl

was

and

unsuccessful

and,

special damages

for

10-12. (R.2).

Trial of the case commenced on January 29, 1990.

A jury was

duly empanelled and counsel for both pcirties delivered opening
statements.

Before

any

witnesses

were

called,

the

parties

stipulated that evidence would be submitted by proffer and the
Court would rule whether such evidence, as proffered and taken in
a light most favorable to Plaintiff, would support a judgment in
favor of Plaintiff.
Order

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and

(hereinafter "Findings" or "Conclusions" or "Order") 1-2.

(R. 320-21;
Based

A. 6-7) .
upon

the proffers

presented

by

counsel, the

lower

court determined, as a matter of law, that based upon Section
78-14-5 of the Utah Code, Defendant was entitled to a directed
verdict.

Accordingly,

prejudice.
In
reasoned

the

Court

dismissed

the

case,

with

Order at 5. (R. 324; A. 10).

support
that

a

of

its

consent

order

of

executed

Lounsbury, was proper under

dismissal,
by

the

lower

court

Plaintiff's

wife,

Janet

Section 78-14-5 (4) (b) of the Utah
4

Codef
with

that the consent
Section

form signed by Mrs. Lounsbury complied

78-14-5 (2) (e)

Defendant was authorized

of

the

Utah

Code

and,

therefore,

as a matter of law to rely upon the

consent to perform the surgery.

Conclusions, 55 2-4. (R. 322; A.

8) .
Further,

the

lower

court

determined

that

Plaintiff

had

failed to prove that he suffered any personal injuries arising
out of the

surgery performed by Defendant, that

a reasonable

prudent person in Plaintiff's position would have consented to
the health care after being fully informed and that the Plaintiff
had

failed

to

show

that

the

unauthorized

surgery

was

the

proximate cause of the injuries he complained of in accordance
with

subsections

Conclusions, M

(c) ,

(f)

and

(g)

of

Section

78-14-5(1).

7-8. (R. 323; A. 9 ) .

The lower court also specifically determined that Plaintiff
could not recover for mental and emotional damages because such
damages were unforeseeable to Defendant and therefore, were not
proximately caused by Defendant's
court

stated

that because

surgery.

Plaintiff

had

Finally, the lower
failed

to

show

that

Defendant was negligent, and that such negligence was a proximate
cause of Plaintiff's injury, he could not recover.
above

reasoning,

the

lower

court

determined

that

Based on the
Plaintiff's

claim for lack of informed consent failed as a matter of law.
Conclusions, M

8-10. (R. 323-24; A. 9-10).

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiff injured his lower back in an industrial accident
on October
treat

the

10, 1986.
injury

by

After

attempting

conservative

physician recommended surgery.

for

several months

means, Plaintiff's

to

treating

Plaintiff sought a second opinion

from a Dr. David Moore in St. George.

Dr. Moore also suggested

surgery, however, he declined to perform it.

(Tr. 46-49).

Ultimately, on April 22, 1987, Plaintiff visited Defendant
and was examined in his office.

Plaintiff stated some personal

misgivings and concerns about having surgery but, subsequent to
the exam, Defendant did recommend surgery.
Defendant

conducted

the examination

Plaintiff

continued

to have misgivings

expressed them to Defendant.

Because of the way

and his oveirall attitude,
about

the

surgery

and

Nevertheless, a myelogram, which is

a special x-ray of the back, was scheduled for May 14, 1987, with
surgery to follow the next morning.
At

the

time

Defendants

(Tr. 49-50).

agent, Brent

schedule the myelogram, Plaintiff

expressed

Little,

called

to

to Little that he

would decide to consent to the surgery after the results of the
myelogram

were

fully

discussed

and

explained

to

Plaintiff.

Plaintiff reiterated these same intentions on the morning of May
14th,

immediately prior to the myelogram being performed.

(Tr.

50-51).
After the myelogram testing was completed by approximately
noon of May

14, 1990, Plaintiff was admitted to Dixie Medical

6

Center in St. George.

At that time a nurse presented Plaintiff

with a consent form for the surgery contemplated by Defendant.
Because Plaintiff had not discussed the results of the myelogram
with Defendant, he refused to execute the consent.

Similarly,

later that afternoon when an anesthetist discussed anesthetic
procedures with Plaintiff, Plaintiff again refused to execute the
consent to anesthetic services.

(Tr. 51-52).

Although even later in the afternoon of May 14th Defendant
did come to the door of Plaintiff's hospital room and state that
he was going to examine the myelogram results, Defendant never
returned to Plaintiff's room to discuss and explain the myelogram
results.

(Tr. 52) .

From approximately 1:00 p.m. on May 14, Plaintiff was given
Demerol

and

other

medication

following morning at 7:00

which

made

him

drousy.

The

a.m., while Plaintiff was under the

influence of the above medication, plus pre-operative anesthetic
that

was

administered

at

approximately

6:00

a.m.,

a

nurse

presented Plaintiff's wife, Janet Lounsbury, a sheaf of forms and
told

her

assumed

to

sign

them.

that Defendant

myelogram

results.

Mrs. Lounsbury
had

spoken

Therefore,

felt

intimidated

to Plaintiff

Mrs.

Lounsbury

and

regarding

the

executed

the

papers, which included a consent form for the surgery and the
anesthetic services.

Immediately after Mrs. Lounsbury executed

the forms, Plaintiff was transported to the surgery suite, where
surgery was ultimately performed on Plaintiff.
103, 120; A. 4-5).

(Tr. 51-53). (P.

Since the surgery was performedf
mental condition have worsened.

Plaintiff's physical and

Testimony from Dr. Reed Fogg, an

orthopedic surgeon, shows that the surgery was unsuccessful and
that Plaintiff1s physical condition was considerably worse at the
time of trial than immediately prior to the surgery.
testimony

from

Dr.

Daniel

P.

Sternberg,

a

Further,

physchologist,

establishes that Plaintiff is now suffering from depression and
related

psychological

surgery.

problems

because

of

the

unsuccessful

(Tr. 71-75).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

POINT

I:

Section

78-14-5 {4) (b)

should

be

liberally

construed in light of subsection (3), which allows any person to
refuse

health

subsection

care

for

religious

or

reasons

and

(2) (e) which invalidates a consent obtained without

legal capacity or by fraudulent omission.
liberal

personal

interpretation

of

Section

Further, based upon a

78-14-5(4),

a

spouse

may

consent to surgery only in an emergency or when the patient is
otherwise unable to execute the consent form himself.
POINT

II;

Assuming

Section

78-14-5 (4) (b)

was

properly

construed by the lower court to authorize Plaintiff's spouse to
consent

to

surgery

unconstitutional

as

upon

applied

Plaintiff,
because

said

it denies

section

is

to Plaintiff

a

basic liberty and a right to privacy to determine what is done
with his own body and to be free from bodily invasion, without a
legitimate state justification or interest to be protected.

8

POINT III:

Because Plaintiff has alleged that Defendant did

not obtain any consent whatsoever, this case does not involve
failure to obtain informed consent, which, as a term of art, is
defined as the disclosure of the facts upon which a patient can
decide whether to submit to health care.

Therefore, based upon

the proper definition of "informed consent", Section 78-14-5(1)
does not apply in this case and Plaintiff can maintain his cause
of action for common law battery.

Finally, even if Plaintiff

must prove the elements of Section 78-14-5(1), he has proffered
sufficient

facts

to

prove

a

prima

facie

case

under

that

provision.
POINT

IV:

Even

assuming

that

the

lower

court

properly

required Plaintiff to prove the additional elements under Section
78-14-5(1)

and

further

assuming

that

Plaintiff

cannot

make a

prima facie case under such elements, then Section 78-14-5(1) is
unconstitutional.

First, it denies Plaintiff a remedy for common

law battery without providing an adequate substitute for it and
without
under

a
the

reasonable
Open

legitimate

Courts

justification,

Provision

of

the

as

Utah

prohibited

Constitution.

Second, the denial of the common law cause of action for battery
deprives Plaintiff of a cause of action
process

of

plaintiffs

law.
in

Finally,

battery

because

actions

(property) without due

Section

against

78-14-5(1)

health

care

treats

providers

differently from plaintiffs in other battery actions, and there
is no rational justification for such distinction, the section is
an

unconstitutional

operation of laws.

denial

of

equal

protection

and

uniform

ARGUMENT
POINT I
SECTION 78-14-5(4)(b) OF THE UTAH CODE WAS
IMPROPERLY CONSTRUED AND APPLIED BY THE LOWER
COURT IN DETERMINING THAT PLAINTIFF'S SPOUSE
WAS AUTHORIZED TO CONSENT TO SURGERY WHEN
PLAINTIFF WAS CAPABLE OF GIVING SUCH CONSENT
HIMSELF AND HAD PREVIOUSLY EXPRESSED HIS
REFUSAL TO CONSENT TO SURGERY
Based upon

its construction

of 78-14-5 (4) (b) of the Utah

Code, the lower court determined that the consent form executed
by

Mrs.

Lounsbury

requirements

of

was

authorized,

Section

that

78-14-5(2)(e)

it

and

fulfilled

that,

the

therefore,

Defendant could rely upon the consent and perform the surgery.
Conclusions, M

2-4.

(p. 322; A. 8 ) .

In so ruling, the lower

court has improperly construed Section 78-14-5(4) (b) in light of
other provisions of the same statute.
Section 68-3-2 of the Utah Code states that statutes "and
their

provisions

liberally

and

all

construed with

statutes

and

to

(1986).

See

Houston

proceedings

a view

promote

them

are

to

be

to effect the objects of the

justice."

Real

under

Estate

Utah

Code

Investment

Ann.

Co. v.

§

68-3-2

Hechler,

44 Utah 64, 138 P. 1159, 1161 (1914).
Another general rule of statutory construction is that the
statute should be considered as a whole and that every provision
should be considered and given meaning if it is possible to give
effect

to

it.

Fletcher

v.

Paige,

124

Mont.

114,

220

P.2d

484, 486 (1950); Union Pacific Railroad Co. v. Bean, 167 Or. 535,
119 P.2d 575, 579 (1941) .
10

In the instant case, the lower court failed to consider two
provisions
ultimate

in its construction of of Section 78-14-5 and its
determination

that

the

consent

executed

by

Mrs.

Lounsbury was proper.
Subsection

(3) provides that "[n]othing contained in this

act shall be construed to prevent any person eighteen years of
age or over from refusing to consent to health care for his own
person upon personal or religious grounds."
78-14-5(3)

(1987).

Subsection

Utah Code Ann. §

(2) (e) provides

that a written

consent form, with all of the provisions required by subsection
(2) (e) , is a defense in an action for failure to obtain consent
"unless the patient proves that the person giving the consent
lacked

capacity

to

consent

or

shows

by

clear

and

convincing proof that the execution of the written consent was
induced

by

the

defendants

misrepresentation
facts."

or

affirmative

fraudulant

omission

acts

of

fraudulent

to

state

material

Id., Subsection (2) (e) .

In this case, Plaintiff specifically stated his intention on
at least two occasions that he would not consent to surgery until
the doctor had fully explained the results of the myelogram with
him.

In effect, therefore, he was refusing to consent until that

discussion

was

completed,

which

it

never

was.

Furthermore,

Plaintiff expressly refused to sign consent forms on at least two
separate
subsection

occasions

when

they

(3), Mrs. Lounsbury

were
could

11

presented

to

not override

him.

Under

Plaintifffs

refusal to consent by executing the consent form under subsection
(4)(b) andf therefore, such consent was invalid.
Because

of

Plaintiff's

repeated

refusal, Mrs.

Lounsbury

"lacked capacity to consent" as provided under subsection (2)(e).
Furthermore, since Defendant never explained the results of the
myelogram to either Plaintiff or his wife, it may amount to a
"fraudulent omission to state material facts1', thereby voiding
any consent form executed by Mrs. Lounsbury.
Even assuming subsections (2)(e) and (3) do not nullify the
consent form executed by Mrs. Lounsbury, subsection (4)(b) should
be liberally construed to apply only when Plaintiff was incapable
of giving the consent himself.

In other words, it must first be

determined whether Plaintiff can give consent under
(4) (e)

as

resorting
(4)(b).

a
to

"patient
obtain

eighteen

consent

years

from

his

oi

age

spouse

or

subsection

over"

under

before

subsection

This court seems to apply such a construction in Reiser

v. Lohner, 641 P.2d 93 (Utah 1982).
In Reiser, a child and her parents brought a malpractice
action for damages related to the obstetrical care of Mrs. Reiser
and the delivery of the child.

Plaintiffs claimed, inter alia,

that the consent for an amniocentesis, which apparently set off
the unfortunate chain of events in the case, should have been
obtained
court

from both parents, not

determined

that

consent

just Mrs. Reiser.
from

only

the

The
mother

lower
was

appropriate and this court affirmed, citing Section 78-14-5 (4) (f)
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for

the

proposition

that

"where

a married

woman

is

in

full

possession of her faculties, she alone has the power to submit to
surgical procedures upon herself."

Id..

at 99.

This court also

stated:
It is the settled general rule that in
the absence of an emergency or unanticipated
conditions, a physician must first obtain the
consent of the patient before treating or
operating on him. The physician must inform
the
patient
of
all
substantial
and
significant risks which might occur; yet he
need
not
advise
the
patient
of
every
conceivable risk.
Id. at 98 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted) .
The sense of Reiser is, then, that the health care provider
must first go to the patient to obtain consent for a surgical
procedure.

If

there

condition making

is

an

the patient

emergency

or

other

unanticipated

incapable of giving his consent,

then, and only then, should the health care provider resort to
obtaining consent from other persons as provided under subsection
(4) (b) .

Indeed, the consent form itself signed by Mrs. Lounsbury

apparently recognized this rule.

It provides that the signature

of a representative is " [t]o be used only if the patient is a
minor or unable to sign."
Defendant

will

(R. 120; A. 5 ) .

likely

contend

that

the

requirements

of

Reiser have been met because, at the time Mrs. Lounsbury signed
the consent

form, Plaintiff

medication.

Such

a

was

contention

unconscious
is

improper,

from

preoperative

however,

in

the

context of the elective surgery that was to be performed upon
Plaintiff.
13

In Eis v. Chestnut, 96 N.M. 45, 627 P.2d 1244

(Ct. App.) ,

cert, denied, 96 N.M. 116, 628 P.2d 686 (1981), plaintiff brought
an action against defendant for medical malpractice and battery,
claiming

that

defendant

performed

plaintiff without plaintiff's
consent

for the surgery

a

knee

consent.

operation

Defendant had

from plaintiff's

daughter

on

the

obtained

on the day

before the surgery, apparently, because at the time, plaintiff
was confused.

The lower court granted summary judgment for the

defendant doctor, but the New Mexico Court of Appeals reversed,
holding that there was a genuine issue of material fact as to
whether

proper

plaintiff.
surgery

consent

could

have

been

obtained

from

the

The court stated that there was no evidence that the

was

performed

in

an

emergency

or

that

plaintiff's

confusion lasted for such a long period that she could not have
consented

at

some other

time, while

she was not

disoriented.

Id., 627 P.2d at 1247.
In

the

instant

case, although

there

is no

dispute

that

Plaintiff was unable to sign the consent form at 7:00 a.m. on the
morning

of

surgery,

this was

elective

surgery,

there was

no

emergency and there is certainly evidence that the^re were other
times at which consent could have been obtained, including two
occasions on the day prior to surgery.

Therefore, if subsection

(4) (b) is construed under the Reiser criteria, then the consent
form executed by Mrs. Lounsbury was insufficient.
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POINT II
SECTION 78-14-5(4)(b), AS APPLIED BY THE
LOWER
COURTf
IS
UNCONSTITUTIONAL
AS
A
DEPRIVATION OF LIBERTY WITHOUT DUE PROCESS
OF LAW AND AS AN IMPROPER DEPRIVATION OF THE
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT TO PRIVACY
Assuming that Section 78-14-5(4)(b) cannot be appropriatelyconstrued

to nullify Mrs. Lounsburyfs

consent to the surgery,

then such provision is unconstitutional as applied in this case
because it deprives Plaintiff of liberty without due process of
law

as

required

Constitutions.
5 7.

under

both

the

United

States

and

Utah

U.S. Const, amend. XIV, § 1; Utah Const, art. I f

Similarly, it deprives Plaintiff of the fundamental right

to privacy as construed to exist under both Constitutions.
Griswold

v.

Connecticut,

381

U.S.

479,

485-86

(1965);

See
cases

cited, infra; Utah Const, art. I, § 27.
As

early

as

1923,

the

United

States

Supreme

Court

has

recognized that liberty encompasses something more than "freedom
from bodily restraint."
(1923).

Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399

There, the Court

stated

the

following

definition

liberty:
Without doubt, it
[liberty] denotes not
merely freedom from bodily restraint but also
the right of the individual to contract, to
engage in any of the common occupations of
life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry,
establish a home and bring up children, to
worship God according to the dictates of his
own conscience, and generally to enjoy those
privileges long recognized at common law as
essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness
by free men.
Id.
i

R

of

This

Court

has

similarly

defined

liberty

in

McGrew

v.

Industrial Commission, 96 Utah 203, 85 P.2d 608, 611 (1938):
[L] iberty as used in the constitution is the
right to enjoy to the fullest extent the
privileges and immunities given or assured by
law to people living withinin the country and
under a government which "derives its just
powers from the consent of the governed,"
subject only to such restrictions as may be
imposed by law for the benefit of the whole,
within the limits of a written constitution
and to a like liberty on the part of the
other members of the body public.
The right to consent to health care upon one's own person is
a

liberty as defined

above.

Indeed, the right to consent to

surgery may even fit into the strictest definition of liberty:
"freedom

from

bodily

restraint."

Certainly,

the

surgery

contemplated here would require confinement to a hospital during
and after surgery subject to its regulations.

In any event, the

right to consent to or refuse surgery or other health care is
generally one of the rights "essential to the ordinary pursuit of
happiness."
Several

courts

have

recognized

a

common

law

right

to

determine what is done with one's own body in terms of health
care and to be free from invasion of one's own body.

See, e.g.,

In re Conservatorship of Torres, 357 N.W.2d 332, 339 (Minn. 1984)
(individual has right to refuse consent to any medical treatment,
"based upon a constitutional right of privacy and/or the common
law right to be free from invasions of one's bodily integrity");
Collins v, Itoh, 503 P.2d

36, 40
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(Mont. 1972)

("[e]ach man is

considered master of his own body and may request or prohibit
even lifesaving surgery") ; In re Welfare of Colyer, 99 Wash. 2d
114,

660

P.2d

738,

743

(1983)

(may

refuse

life

sustaining

treatment on basis of "common law right to be free from bodily
invasion") ;

Crawford v. Wojnas, 51 Wash. App. 781 f 783, 754 P.2d

1302, 1303 (1988) (informed consent doctrine is "premised on the
fundamental principal that

f

[e]very human being of adult years

and sound mind has a right to determine what shall be done with
his own body 1 ")

(quoting

Schloendorff v. Society

of New York

Hospitals, 213 N.Y. 125, 129, 105 N.E. 92 (1914)).
Although, based upon the general definitions and case law
cited above, the right tc consent to health care appears to be a
liberty entitled to the protections of substantive due process,
most, if not all, courts have determined the constitutionality of
laws that restrict the right to consent to health care on the
basis that such a right of consent flows from the

fundamental

right to privacy.
No court has directly determined the constitutionality

of

Section 78-14-4(b) or a similar statute.

Nevertheless, because

the

care

right

to

consent

or

refuse

health

is

at

least

a

fundamental common law right, the analysis adopted by courts in
the "right to privacy" cases is applicable here.
No analysis of the right to privacy should be considered
without a discussion of Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).

There,

a woman brought an action for declaratory and injunctive relief
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on the basis that Texas criminal laws prohibiting abortion were
unconstitutional.

A

three-judge

panel

of

the

United

States

District Court for the Northern District of Texas determined the
abortion

laws were unconstitutional

and the case was

directly to the United States Supreme Court.

appealed

The Court affirmed,

holding that it was unconstitutional to prohibit abortions at all
stages of pregnancy.
The

Roe

constitutional

v.

Id. at 165-66.
Wade

right

of

Court

reasoned

privacy

founded

that
upon

there
the

was

a

concept

of

liberty under the Fourteenth Amendment and determined that such
right includes a right to an abortion.
Meyer

v. Nebraska,

supra) .

The

Court

deprivation of the right of privacy

Ld. at 153-54
then

(citing

concluded

that a

(to have an abortion) could

only be justified when outweighed by substantial state interests.
Id.

Because

sufficient,

the

Court

justifiable

determined
state

that

interest

to

there

was

prohibit

not

a

abortions

under any circumstances, it determined the Texas abortion laws to
be

an

unconstitutional

deprivation

of

the

right

to

privacy.

Further, to pass constitutional muster, the Court held that a
statute must be narrowly drawn to express only legitimate state
interests.

Id..

155-56.

See also People v. Belous, 71 Cal. 2d

954, 458 P.2d 194, 199-201 (1969).
The United States Supreme Court has also held that it is an
unconstitutional deprivation of the right to privacy to require
that a spouse consent to an abortion before

it is performed.

Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 68-71 (1976).
18

In

this

case

there

is

no

legitimate

state

interest

in

allowing a spouse to consent to surgery under all circumstances.
The

only

conceivable

legitimate

purpose

for

such

a provision-

would be if the patient was unable to consent himself
because
nately,

of

incompetence

Section

or

an

emergency

78-14-5 (4) (b)

is

not

either

situation.

Unfortu2
narrowly drawn.

so

Therefore, as in Roe v. Wade y that statute is unconstitutional as
applied in this case.
Although
limited

the

United

States

Supreme

the effect of Roe v. Wade

Court

has

in Webster v.

apparently

Reproductive

Health Services, 109 S.Ct. 3040 (1989) , it did not derogate the
fundamental right to privacy
remains the same.

and the analysis

in Roe v. Wade

Further, the state interest advanced in both

Roe v. Wade and Webster, is the desire to protect a fetus and
further

the

inapplicable

reproduction
in

this

case

of

life.

because

That

justification

Plaintiff's

is

determination

whether to consent to elective surgery has no direct effect upon
anyone else's life, only his own.
Another line of cases applying due process standards to the
right of privacy are those involving the decision to terminate

Conceivably, if a spouse could consent under all circumstances
he/she could consent to a surgical procedure for a patient, such
as sterilization, despite the patient's religious or personal
objections to such a procedure.
2
Of course, nothing precludes this court from determining that
the legislature intended subsection (4) (b) to be so interpreted
and construed.
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life sustaining procedures
patients.
N.J.

for terminally

ill or

"brain dead"

The seminal case on this issue is In re Quinlany 70

10, 355 A.2d

647

(1976).

There, a father

sought to be

appointed guardian of his daughter so that he could direct and
authorize the discontinuance of life sustaining procedures for
the

comatose

guardianship

daughter.
and

the

supporting equipment.

The

lower

authorization

court
to

denied

terminate

both

the

the

life

The New Jersey Supreme Court determined

that the father could make the decision to terminate the life
supporting

systems on behalf of his daughter if the

attending

physician determined that there was no reasonable possibility of
the daughter ever recovering.
In its holding, the New Jersey Supreme Court determined that
there was a constitutional right to privacy

"broad enough to

encompass a patient's decision to decline medical treatment under
certain circumstances, in much the same way as it is broad enough
to encompass

a woman's

certain conditions."
supra) .

decision

to

terminate

pregnancy

under

3x1. , 355 A. 2d at 663 (citing Roe v. Wade,

Again, as in Roe v. Wade, the New Jersey Supreme Court

weighed the right of privacy against the interests of the state
in the preservation

of human

life and determined

that, after

certain safeguards were met, the right to determine what is done
with one's body

is paramount

over the state's interests.

See

also, In re Welfare of Colyer, 99 Wash. 2d 114, 660 P.2d 738,
742-44 (1983) .
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The

California

Quinlan/Colyer

rule

Court
step

Appeals

further

has

carried

the

in Bartling v.

Superior

Court, 163 Cal. App. 3d 186, 209 Cal. Rptr. 220 (1984).

There, a

patient himself

one

of

sought to terminate

treatment for a condition

that, although probably incurable, was not diagnosed as terminal.
The lower court denied an injunction requiring the hospital to
disconnect

a

respirator

but

the

California

Court

of

Appeals

remanded, holding that the patient had the right to order the
disconnection
state's
third

of

the

equipment.

interest of preservation

parties, preventing

ethics, against the right

Again,
of

suicide

after

weighing

life, protecting

and

to exercise

protecting
control

the

innocent

professional

over one's

own

body, the California Court of Appeals determined that the latter
interest was paramount.

The court

stated

that

" fa person

of

adult years and in sound mind has the right, in the exercise of
control over his own body, to determine whether or not to submit
to lawful medical treatment•'"

Id. at 193-94, 209 Cal. Rptr. at

224 (quoting Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d 229, 242, 502 P.2d 1, 9
(1972)) .
In this case, Plaintiff did not need the surgery to preserve
his life.

Further, the surgery was entirely elective.

Indeed,

Plaintiff had spent considerable time obtaining second and third
opinions to determine whether surgery was warranted.

Plaintiff

had no incurable or terminal illness making the surgery necessary
to preserve his life.

Accordingly, the state's interest in this

case, if anyf is substantially less significant than in Quinlany
Colyer

or Bartlingy

interests
medical

were

outweighed

treatment.

Bartling,

all of which determined
by

the

right

Accordingly,

Section

as

78-14-5 (4) (b)

In
is

to

that

the

consent

Quinlan,
an

or

state's
refuse

Colyer

and

unconstitutional

deprivation of the rights of personal liberty, privacy and other
applicable fundamental rights.
POINT III
THE LOWER COURT IMPROPERLY CONSTRUED SECTION
78-14-5(1) TO PRECLUDE PLAINTIFF'S CAUSE OF
ACTION FOR COMMON LAW BATTERY
The lower court determined that Plaintiff had failed to meet
at least three of the requirements to maintain a cause of action
against Defendant

under

Section

78-14-5(1)

of

the Utah Code.

That subsection provides that to maintain an action for failure
to

obtain

informed

consent,

he

must

show

that

he

"suffered

personal injuries arising out of the health care rendered", that
he "would not have consented to the hecilth care rendered" after
being fully informed of the facts and that "the unauthorized part
of

the

personal

health

care

injuries

rendered

was

suffered"

by

the

proximate

him.

Utah

cause
Code

of

the

Ann.

§

78-14-5(1) (c) , (f) , (g) (1987) .
Plaintiff's complaint alleges a cause of action for common
law battery based upon Defendant's failure to obtain any consent
for

the

surgery.

action, Section

Assuming

78-14-5(1)

it

is

requires
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applicable

to

that Plaintiff

Plaintiff's
prove

more

than

he

ordinarily

would

be

required

to

prove

in

order

to

maintain a cause of action for common law battery.
As a general rule, in an action for common law battery, a
plaintiff need not necessarily show that he sustained personal
injury.

Neither is proximate cause an element of a common law

cause of action for battery. 6 Am. Jur. 2d Assault and Battery §§
5, 111, 178, 180 (1963).

The New Mexico Court of Appeals applied

this general rule in Eis v. Chestnut, 96 N.M. 45, 627 P.2d 1244
(Ct. App.), cert, denied, 628 P.2d

686

(1981), and stated the

following with a regard to a battery similar to the one here:
A physician who operates without the
patient's consent commits a battery
. . . .
In a suit against a surgeon for battery there
is no need that the patient be physically
damaged by the surgery. Consequently, there
is no need for expert medical testimony to
show either causation or standard of care.
The only question to be determined is whether
the
patient
consented
to
the
specific
operation performed.
Id. at 1246 (citations omitted).
Assuming that Plaintiff need not meet the criteria set forth
in Section 78-14-5(1), by construing the facts of the case in a
light most favorable to Plaintiff, Plaintiff can certainly make
out a prima facie case for common law battery.

And, based upon

rules of construction, the requirements of subsection (1) should
not apply in this case.

?-}

Section 68-3-11 of the Utah Code provides as follows:
Words and phrases are to be construed
according to the context and the approved
usage of the language; but technical words
and phrases, and such others as have acquired
a peculiar and appropriate meaning in law, or
are defined by statute, are to be construed
according to such peculiar and appropriate
meaning or definition,
Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-11 (1986).
Section 78-14-5(1) provides that the subject criteria must
be met "in an action based upon the provider's failure to obtain
informed consent." Utah Code Ann. § 78-34-5(1) (emphasis added).
Since "informed consent" is a term of art having a "peculiar and
appropriate meaning in law" Section 78-14-5(1) must be construed
according to the peculiar definition of informed consent.
Black 1 s

Law

Dictionary

defines

"informed

consent"

follows:
A person 1 s agreement to allow something to
happen (such as surgery) that is based on a
full disclosure of facts needed to make the
decision intelligently; i.e. , knowledge of
risks involved, a]ternatives, etc. Informed
consent is the name for a general principle
of law that a physician has a duty to
disclose what a reasonably prudent physician
in the medical community in the exercise of
reasonable care would disclose to his patient
as to whatever grave risks of injury might be
incurred from a proposed course of treatment,
so that a patient, exercising ordinary care
for his own welfare, and faced with a choice
of undergoing the proposed treatment, or
alternative treatment, or none at all, may
intelligently
exercise
his
judgment
by
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as

reasonably
balancing
the
probable
risks
againsts against the probable benefits.
Black1s

Law

Dictionary

701

(5th

ed.

1979) (citing

ZeBarth

v,

Swedish Hospital Medical Center, 81 Wash. 2d 12, 499 P.2d 1, 8
(1972)) .
In the instant case, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant did
not make any disclosures of the

facts he felt were needed in

order to decide whether to submit to surgery.

Plaintiff simply

alleges that Defendant did not obtain any consent whatsoever to
perform

the

surgery.

Consequently,

the

wrongful

acts

that

Plaintiff alleges do not fall within the definition of "informed
consent" as the term is used in Section 78-14-5(1), and he need
not prove the elements outlined in that subsection.
At least two courts have recognized a distinction between an
action

based

action

for

battery.

upon
failure

failure
to

to

obtain

obtain
any

informed

consent

consent

whatsoever,

and

an

namely

In Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d 229, 502 P.2d 1 (1972),

the California Supreme Court explained the difference between a
duty to provide informed consent and the failure to obtain any
consent whatsoever:
The battery theory should be reserved for
those circumstances when a doctor performs an
operation to which the plaintiff has not
consented. . . . However, when the patient
consents to the certain treatment and the
doctor
performs
that
treatment
but
an
undisclosed inherent complication with a low
probability occurs, no intentional deviation
from the consent given appears; rather, the
doctor in obtaining consent may have failed
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to meet his care duty to disclose pertinent
information*
In that situation the action
should be pleaded in negligence.
Id. , 502 P.2d at 8. See also Miller v. Kennedy, 11 Wash. App.
272, 522 P.2d 852, 860 (1974).
In the instant case, the elements that a patient must prove
in order to maintain an action for lack of informed consent are
essentially elements of negligence, which is appropriate, based
upon

the

distinct

duty

established

in

Cobbs

and

Miller.

Conversely, based upon Cobbs and Miller, since the Plaintiff in
this case has alleged, and can prove, that Defendant obtained no
consent whatsoever for the surgery performed, he need only prove
the

elements

of

battery

and

not

the

negligence

elements

of

Section 78-14-5(1).
Even assuming that Plaintiff must establish the elements of
Section

78-14-5(1)

in

order

to

maintain

this

action,

the

evidence, when considered in a light most favorable to Plaintiff,
establishes that he has met the elements that the lower court
found lacking.
Plaintiff has demonstrated

that he has

suffered

injuries as a result of the unsuccessful surgery.

personal

Both Dr. Fogg

and Dr. Sternberg have testified that Plaintiff's physical and
mental condition have worsened

since the unsuccessful surgery.

Furthermore, Dr. Sternberg has testified that the emotional and
mental injuries that Plaintiff has suffered were caused by the
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unsuccessful

surgery.

Finally,

because

cf

Plaintiff's

apprehensions about Dr. Capel in general, it is not conclusively
established,

as

a matter

of

law,

that

Plaintiff

would

have

consented to the surgery even if Dr. Capel had shown Plaintiff
that

the

myelogram

results

regardless of the Court's
Plaintiff

has

made

a

dictated

surgery.

construction

prama

facie

of

case

Accordingly,

Section
for

78-14-5(1),

battery

and/or

negligence.
POINT IV
SECTION 78-14-5(1), AS APPLIED BY THE LOWER
COURT, IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL BECAUSE IT DEMIES
PLAINTIFF A REMEDY FOR COMMON LAW BATTERY,
DEPRIVES PLAINTIFF OF DUE PROCESS AND DENIES
PLAINTIFF OF EQUAL PROTECTION AND UNIFORM
APPLICATION OF THE LAW
Even
Section

assuming

78-14-5(1)

€ilements

in

order

that

the

lower

to

require

to

maintain

court

Plaintiff
his

cause

properly
to
of

prove

construed
additional

action,

such

a

construction, as applied in this case, unconstitutionally denies
Plaintiff his right to a common law action for battery under the
Open Courts Provision of the Utah Constitution.
I, § 11.
for

Utah Const, art.

Moreover, the effective abrogation of Plaintiff's claim

common

law

battery

denies

him

substantive

due

process

guaranteed under both the Federal and State Constitutions.
Const,

amend. XIV,

§ 1; Utah

Const, art. I, § 7.

U.S.

Finally,

because there is no justifiable basis for denying Plaintiff an
action for common law battery in this case, while preserving such
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a right in all other situations, Plaintiff has been denied equal
protection and uniform application of the laws as required under
both the Federal and State Constitutions,

U.S. Const, amend.

XIV, § 1; Utah Const, art. I, § 24.
A.

Open Courts
Article I, Section 11 of the Utah Constitution declares that

"[a]11 courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done
to him in his person, property or reputation, shall have remedy
by due

course

of

law

. . .

."

Utah Const, art. I, § 11.

Although this court has never addressed the constitutionality of
Section 78-14-5(1) under Article I, Section 11, it has set forth
criteria for analyzing the constitutionality of laws under the
Open

Courts

Provision

in

several

recent

cases

testing

the

constitutionality of statutes of repose.
In Berry ex rel. Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 717 P.2d 670
(Utah

19 85) , plaintiffs

brought

an

action

for wrongful

death

against the manufacturer of an airplane under products liability
theories for defects in the airplane that caused the death of
their

husband

and

father.

The

lower

court

granted

summary

judgment to the defendant manufacturer of the airplane on the
grounds that the action was barred under a products

liability

statute of repose providing that such an action cannot be brought
for more than six years after the product is initially purchased
or ten years after its date of manufacture.

This court reversed

the summary judgment and remanded the matter to the lower court
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for trial, holding that the products liability statute of repose
was unconstitutional under the Open Courts Provision.
established

a

two-part

analysis

for

determining

The court
whether

a

provision is unconstitutional under the Open Courts Provision:
First, section 11 is satisfied if the law
provides an injured person an effective and
reasonable alternative remedy "by due course
of law" for vindication of his constitutional
interest.
The
benefit provided
by the
substitute must be substantially equal in
value
or
other
benefit
to
the
remedy
abrogated in providing essentially comparable
substantive
protection
to
one's
person,
property, or reputation, although the form of
the substitute remedy may be different. . . .
Second, if there is no substitute or
alternative remedy provided, abrogation of
the remedy or cause of action may be
justified only if there is a clear social or
economic evil to be eliminated and the
elimination of an existing legal remedy is
not an arbitrary on unreasonable means for
achieving the objective.
Id. at 680 (citations and footnote omitted).
This court has adopted the Berry test in subsequent cases
involving

the builders and architects

statute of repose.

See

Horton v. Goldminer's Daughter, 785 P.2d 1087, 1094 (Utah 1989);
Sun Valley Waterbeds v Herm Hughes & Son, 782 P.2d 188, 191-92
(Utah 1989) .
Under the first part of the analysis, it appears that the
substitute remedy contemplated would be something similar to the
worker's compensation and no fault insurance provisions.
717 P.2d at 677.

Berry,

In this case, there is no alternative statutory

?Q

remedy

like worker's

compensation

or no

fault

insurance

that

would compensate a person for a nonconsensual surgery.
Defendant

will

likely

argue

that

the

legislature

has

established a remedy for failure to obtain consent under Section
78-14-5(1).

However, as discussed below, that remedy is wholly

inadequate to compensate the plaintiff for an unwanted invasion
of

his body

when

the

surgery may

have

been

successful.

The

substitute is not substantially equal to the one at common law.
The second prong of the Berry analysis is whether there is
any

reasonable

statute
Care

or

in question.

Malpractice

reduce

justifiable

purpose

behind

the

The stated objective of the Utah Health

Act, which

malpractice

legislative

premiums

includes
and

Section

insure

78-14-5,

the

is

to

availability

of

malpractice insurance, thereby making health care more available
to the public in general.

Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-2 (1987).

That

justification is simply not appropriate under the facts of this
case.
First,
provide

insurers,

coverage

battery.

for

including

malpractice

intentional

torts

insurers,

such

as

rarely

assault

and

Even if an insurance policy did somehow insure against

intentional

torts, it would

policy because

it would

injury

persons.

against

likely be void

encourage

as against public

intentional, even criminal,

Accordingly,

allowing

an

action

for

common law battery would have no effect whatsoever on the stated
policy of reducing and making available malpractice insurance.
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Second, an action

for

common

law battery

would

derogate

another state interest in regulating the wrongful and improper
conduct of physicians.

By abrogating the action for common law

battery, the legislature
"You

may

perform

is, in effect, saying to physicians:

surgeries

without

consent

and

will

not

be

liable, as long as you do not cause any personal injury to the
patient and as long as you can show that the patient would have
consented

anyway

if

you

had

asked

him."

Certainly,

the

legislature did not intend to give physicians such a free hand.
Because there is no justifiable legislative purpose behind
abrogation

of

an

78-14-5(1)

cannot,

action

for

common

constitutionally,

law
be

battery,

applied

to

Section
prevent

Plaintiff1s claim in this case.
B.

Due Prccess
In Berry, this court stated as follows:
To a degree, the open courts provision
is an extension of the due process clause.
Indeed, the open courts provision and the due
process clause also have an overlapping
function, to some extent, with respect to the
abrogation of causes of action.
If the
Legislature were to abolish all causes of
action for injuries to one's person or
property caused by defective products and
provide no substitute equivalent remedy, we
have little doubt that it would violate
Section 11, and perhaps even the due process
clause of Article I, Section 7.

Berry,

717

Hospital,

P.2d
775

at
P.2d

679, quoted
348,

357

in, Condemarin
(Utah

opinion).
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v.

19 89) (Durham,

University
J.,

lead

It

appears

that

the

criteria

for

determining

whether

abrogation of the cause of action for common law battery

is a

denial of substantive due process is virtually identical to the
criteria under the Open Courts Provision as set forth in Berry,
Consequently, Plaintiff has addressed the due process analysis
only briefly.
A few courts have determined that laws denying causes of
action constitute a deprivation of property without due process
of

law

and,

therefore,

are

unconstitutional.

See,

e.g.,

Brinkerhoff-Faris Trust & Savings Co. v. Hill, 281 U.S. 673, 678
(1930)(judgment denying relief from discrimination for failure to
first

seek

an

administrative

remedy

is

an

unconstitutional

deprivation of property without due process); Morris v. Gross,
572 S.W.2d

902, 905

(Tenn. 1978) (vested

rights of

action

are

property which cannot be deprived without due process of law) ;
Buttrey v. Guaranteed Securities Co., 78 Utah 39, 300 P. 1040,
1045

(1931) (repeal

of

statute

would

be

unconstitutional

deprivation of property without due process of law for rights
under statute that have vested prior to repeal).
C.

Equal Protection and Uniform Operation of Laws
Article I, Section 24 of the Utah Constitution provides that

!t

[a]ll laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation."

Utah Const, art. I, § 24.

Similarly, the Fourteenth Amendment to

the United States Constitution provides that no state shall "deny
to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws."

U.S. Const, amend XIV, § 1.
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This court has recently construed the application of both of
the above provisions in Malan v. Lewis, 693 P.2d 661 (Utah 1984).
There,

this

court

struck

Automobile Guest Statute.
criteria

for

down

as

unconstitutional

the

Utah

This court established the following

determining

whether

a

provision

is

an

unconstitutional denial of equal protection:
Article I, § 24 protects against two
types of discrimination. First, a law must
apply equally to all persons within a class.
Second, the statutory classifications and the
different treatment given the classes must be
based on differences that have a reasonable
tendency to further the objectives of the
statute.
If
the
relationship
of
the
classification to the statutory objectives is
unreasonable or fanciful, the discrinination
is unreasonable.

When persons are similarly situated, it
is unconstitutional to single out one person
or a group of persons from among a larger
class on the basis of a tenuous justification
that has little or no merit.
Id.

at

670-71

(citations

omitted) .

Accord,

Condemarin

v.

University Hospital, 775 P.2d 348, 352 (Utah 1989); Mountain Fuel
Supply Co. v. Salt Lake City Corp., 752 P.2d 884, 889-90

(Utah

1988).
In this case, it would appear that Section 78-14-5(1) is not
unconstitutional under the first criteria established in Malan.
All plaintiffs who have brought an action for common law battery
against

a health

care provider
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are

treated

the

same and

all

plaintiffs who

have brought

an action

for common

against other defendants are treated the* same.

law battery

In other words,

it is the type of defendant, whether a health care provider or
otherwise, that
plaintiff

determines

falls.

the

class

Consequently,

into which

under

the

a

second

particular
criteria

established in Malan, in ord€>r for the abrogation of an action
for common law battery to pass constitutional muster, there must
be some reasonable legislative justification and objective that
is fulfilled by the classification.

Indeed, it appears that the
3
analysis is essentially the scime as in Berry.
For the

same reasons

stated

in the analysis of the Open

Courts Provision, above, any justification or rationale offered
for applying Section 78-14-5(1), to depiive Plaintiff of a cause
of action for common law battery, is irrational, tenuous and not
justified.

Therefore, such an application amounts to a denial of

equal protection and/or uniform operation of laws.

In Condemarin, two justices in the majority expressed some
dissatisfaction in using the* equal protection analysis rather
than a due process analysis (or open courts analysis) for
determining the constitutionality of a governmentally immunity
provision, Condemarin, 775 P.2d at 357-60 (Durham, J., lead
opinion), 366-68 (Zimmerman, J., concurring in part).
On the
other hand, the third justice concurring in the majority and both
dissenting justices believed the equal protection approach to be
the more appropriate. 3^3.. at 369-70 (Stewart, J., separate
opinion), 378-380 (Hall, C.J., dissenting).
Because of this
apparent divergence in the court, Plaintiff has presented for
review analyses under both approaches.
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CONCLUSION
Based upon the above discussion, this court should reverse
the lower court's directed verdict and order of dismissal and
remand the case to the lower court for trial before the trier of
fact.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this c^S^day

of July, 1990.

CHAMBERLAIN & HIGBEE

jjjfeM
AttorfeeVs for

Plaintiff/Appellant

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this

J?6* day of July, 1990, four

(4) copies of the within and foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANT were
served upon Elliott J. Williams and Elizabeth King Brennan at
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN

& MARTINEAU, 10 Exchange Place, 11th Floor,

P.O. Box 45000, Salt Lake City, Utah 84145.

6cJ/6^~-—
FLOYD WVHOLM
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ADDENDUM

78-14-5. Failure to obtain informed consent — Proof r e quired of patient— Defenses — Consent to health
care.
(1) When a person submits to health care rendered by a health care provider, it shall be presumed that what the health care provider did was either
expressly or impliedly authorized to be done. For a patient to recover damages
from a health care provider in an action based upon the provider's failure to
obtain informed consent, the patient must prove the following:
(a) that a provider-patient relationship existed between t h e patient
and health care provider; and
(b) the health care provider rendered health care to the patient; and
(c) the patient suffered personal injuries arising out of the health care
rendered; and
(d) the health care rendered carried with it a substantial and significant risk of causing the patient serious harm; and
(e) the patient was not informed of the substantial and significant risk;
and

(0 a reasonable, prudent person in the patient's position would not
have consented to the health care rendered after having been fully informed as to all facts relevant to the decision to give consent. In determining what a reasonable, prudent person in the patient's position would do
under the circumstances, the finder of fact shall use the viewpoint of t h e
patient before health care was provided and before the occurrence of a n y
personal injuries alleged to have arisen from said health care; and
(g) the unauthorized part of the health care rendered was the proximate cause of personal injuries suffered by the patient.
(2) It shall be a defense to any malpractice action against a health care
ovider based upon alleged failure to obtain informed consent if:
(a) the risk of the serious harm which the patient actually suffered was
relatively minor; or
(b) the risk of serious harm to the patient from the health care provider
was commonly known to the public; or
(c) the patient stated, prior to receiving the health care complained of,
t h a t he would accept the health care involved regardless of the risk; or
t h a t he did not want to be informed of the matters to which he would be
entitled to be informed; or
(d) the health care provider, after considering all of the attendant facts
and circumstances, used reasonable discretion as to the manner and extent to which risks were disclosed, if the health care provider reasonably
believed that additional disclosures could be expected to have a substantial and adverse effect on the patient's condition; or
(e) the patient or his representative executed a written consent which
sets forth the nature and purpose of the intended health care and which
contains a declaration t h a t the patient accepts the risk of substantial a n d
serious harm, if any, in hopes of obtaining desired beneficial results of
health care and which acknowledges that health care providers involved
have explained his condition and the proposed health care in a satisfactory niaiiiici .snd that all questions asked about ih<j health care and n>
attendant risks have been answered in a manner satisfactory to the patient or his representative; such written consent bhall be a defense to an
action against a health care provider based upon failure to obtain informed consent unless the patient proves that the person giving the consent lacked capacity to consent or shows by clear and convincing proof
that the execution of the written consent was induced by the defendant's
affirmative acts of fraudulent misrepresentation or fraudulent omission
to state material facts.
(3) Nothing contained in this act shall be construed to prevent any person
ghteen years of age or over from refusing to consent to health care for his
vn person upon personal or religious grounds.
(4) The following persons are authorized and empowered to consent to any
;alth care not prohibited by law:
(a) any parent, whether an adult or a minor, for his minor child;
(b) any married person, for a spouse;
(c) any person temporarily standing in loco parentis, whether formally
serving or not, for the minor under his care and any guardian for h i s
ward;
(d) any person eighteen years of age or over for his or her parent who is
unable by reason of age, physical or mental condition, to provide such
consent;

(e) any patient eighteen years of age or over;
(f) any female regardless of age or marital status, when given in connection with her pregnancy or childbirth;
(g) in the absence of a parent, any adult for his minor brother or sister;
and
(h) in t h e absence of a parent, any grandparent for his m i n o r grandchild.
(5) No person who in good faith consents or authorizes health care t r e a t ment or procedures for another as provided by this act shall be subject to civil
liability.

DIXIE M E D I A L CENTER
544 South 400 East • (801) 673-9681
St. George, Utah 84770

loj/o / g o

PREOPERATIVE I N F O R M A T I O N

Have you had:

L+J^L

H a v e you had:

Heart trouble

Broken bones of face

Asthma

Broken bones of neck or back

Jr^s> No
3
_Ye^) No h^-xi^L-^

Epilepsy

Previous anesthesia

jfes^No

Jaundice

Bad reaction to anesthesia

Yes ffto^J^<^>

Kidney disease

Relatives with bad reactions

Other illnesses

j

w

/f*<

Q

Yes ( N o

to anesthesia

3ack trouble
Bleeding tendency
^oJiKj^^-

Do You:

Allergies

<^>No

- .

False teeth or loose teeth

T a k e medicine or drugs

(III

Caps or bridges

W e a r contact lenses

Abnormal chest x-ray

Smoke

Abnormal ECG

Drink Alcohol

Yes ( N o ^

Are you pregnant

Yes (>Jg»

Yes

No

YesJ> No
(^Ye£>

/c2. ^ 2 ^ / c V \ ^ o .

Age
Present weight
Height
Do you have any problems to discuss with anesthesia?

Yes

(No

I understand that there can be comolicatlons with any anesthetic a n d those complications have been
discussed with me.
Patient's Signature

t/

C.N.S.

as.

y

Other

C.V.S.
Lab results

For:

P.S

f^/^r-A^ • 3J

©

L

SAB

.Complications explained.

Epidural

if.

Local

._ Risk a c c e p t e d .

0

NOTES:

L/

\) Ac>r>YTW^^c^ h^^^^^J^^

/
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H*-.
n/j^

*

(Anesthesia)
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DIXIE MEDICAL CENTER
544 South 400 East, St. George. Utah 84770. 801-673-9681

CONSENT TO OPERATION, ANESTHETICS,
AND OTHER MEDICAL SERVICES
I authorize and request the performance upon
(patient name)
of the following operation: JU^^-c^y-y^pr€ ^ - r ^ o o

o o ^ -S;^^N

L ^| - ^

QV

'
<r\ r\c\

1.5-"S>

to be performed by Dr. Q OxJ^
assistants of his/her choice^

V

a

P ^
0

with

any

associaces

°r

I acknowledge that my physician(s) has explained my condition, the nature and purpose
of the proposed health care or surgical procedure, as well as alternative treatment(s),
and that all questions asked about the health care and its attendant risks have been
answered in a satisfactory manner. I hereby accept the risk of substantial and serious
harm, if any, in hopes of obtaining desired beneficial results of the health care.
I also understand that the proposed care may involve possibilities of complications and
that certain complications have been know to occur following the procedure to which
I am consenting even when the utmost c a r e , judgement and skill are used. I understand
that there have been no guarantees made to me as to the results of the surgical procedure.
I recognize that during the course of the procedure unforeseen conditions may require
additional or different procedures than those explained. 1, therefore, authorize and request
that my physician and any associates or assistants of his/her choice perform such procedures as, in their professional judgement, are necessary and desirable for my well-being.
1 further consent to the administration of such anesthesia as may be necessary or appropriate for such procedure.
I further consent to the examination of any tissues or parts which may be removed from
my body by the hospital authorities, and further consent to the disposal of such tissues
and parts by hospital authorities.
For purposes of advancing medical education, I consent to the admittance of medical
personnel to the operating room.
I HAVE READ AND UNDERSTAND THIS DOCUMENT AND AUTHORIZE AND ACCEPT
THE PROPOSED CARE REGARDLESS OF THE RISK.
/Dat£

Time

Witness

^

Approved Surgery Committee: 12/86

/

Patient's Signature

~V

Relationship to Patient
(To be usetf only if patient is a minor
or unable to sign)
O O f l*^Q

';;:;;TV
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ELLIOTT J. WILLIAMS (A3483)
ELIZABETH KING BRENNAN (A4863)
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
Attorneys for Defendant
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor
Post Office Box 45000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Telephone: (801) 521-9000

IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
MICHEL LOUNSBURY,

FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS
OF LAW AND ORDER

Plaintiff,
vs.
NEAL C. CAPEL, M.D.,

Civil No. 89-2550
Judge J. Philip Eves

Defendant.

This action came on regularly for jury trial on January 29,
1990, before the above-entitled Court, the Honorable J. Philip
Eves presiding.

The plaintiff appeared personally and by and

through his counsel, Floyd W. Holm, Esq. of Chamberlain & Higbee,
and defendant appeared personally and by and through his counsel,
Elliott J. Williams, Esq. and Elizabeth King Brennan, Esq. of
Snow, Christensen & Martineau.

The parties selected a jury and

presented opening statements.
After the parties1 opening statements, the parties
stipulated that plaintiff could present a proffer of evidence
which the Court could then rely upon to determine whether a

sufficient factual and legal basis had been shown to submit the
case to the jury.

Plaintiff, through his counsel, presented a

proffer on the record of evidence he anticipated his witnesses
would offer should they be called to testify.

At the conclusion

of the proffer, defendant made a Motion to Dismiss based on the
insufficiency of the evidence presented in light of the statutory
requirements of the Health Care Malpractice Act, §78-14-1, et
seg., Utah Code Ann. (1953, as amended).
The Court now makes the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

The plaintiff, Michel Lounsbury was injured in an

industrial accident on October 10, 1986.
2.

Plaintiff was admitted to Dixie Medical Hospital for

surgery on May 14, 1987.
3.

On the morning of surgery, a consent form authorizing

surgery was signed by plaintiff's wife.
4.

The surgical consent form authorized surgery by Dr.

Capel for Michel Lounsbury.
5.

The surgery authorized was the surgery performed by Dr.

Capel.
6.

There is no evidence of fraudulent concealment or

fraudulent omission to state material facts on the part of Dr.
Capel.

-2-

From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court draws the
following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

This action is a medical malpractice action against a

health care provider which is governed by the Utah Health Care
Malpractice Act, §78-14-1 et seq., Utah Code Ann. (1953 as
amended).
2.

Mrs. Lounsbury was authorized and empowered by the

provisions of Section 78-14-5(4)(b) to consent to health care
rendered to her husband.
3.

The consent form the plaintiff's spouse, Janet

Lounsbury, signed on her husband1 s behalf complied with the
provisions of Section 78-14-5 (2) (e) , Utah Code Ann,, (1953, as
amended).
4.

Dr. Capel was authorized as a matter of law to rely on

said consent in performing the surgery.
5.

When a person submits to health care rendered by a

health care provider, it is presumed that what the health care
provider did was either expressly or impliedly authorized to be
done.

Section 78-14-5(1), Utah Code Ann. (1953, as amended).
6.

The consent form executed by the plaintiff's spouse

provides a complete defense to plaintiff's claim of alleged
failure to obtain his consent to the surgery.
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7.

Plaintiff also failed as a matter of law to establish

the other elements of a claim for lack of informed consent as
outlined in Section 78-14-5(1), Subsections (a) through (g) .

To

prevail on a claim for lack of informed consent, plaintiff must
establish each and every element of said section.

However, in

this case plaintiff offered no evidence that he suffered personal
injuries arising out of the health care rendered, as required by
subsection (c); nor that a reasonable prudent person in the
patientfs position would not have consented to the health care
rendered after having been fully informed as to all the facts
relevant to the decision to give consent as required by
subsection (f); nor that the unauthorized part of the health care
rendered was the proximate cause of personal injuries suffered by
the plaintiff, as required by subsection (g).
8.

Further, by failing to produce evidence of physical

damages which were proximately caused by Dr. Capelfs conduct,
plaintiff's claim for lack of informed consent fails as a matter
of law.
9.

In a negligence action against a health care

professional, plaintiff must establish, usually through expert
testimony, that the defendants conduct deviated from recognized
and accepted standards and that said conduct was a proximate
cause of the damages as alleged by the plaintiff.

Based on

plaintiff's proffer, the court finds as a matter of law that the
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evidence does not establish negligence on the part of the
defendant, nor that defendants conduct proximately caused
physical damages,
10.

The plaintiff in this medical malpractice action cannot

recover for emotional or psychological damages because there is
no evidence establishing proximate causation.

Thus, defendant

Dr. Capel can not be held accountable for unforeseeable
psychological consequences of his surgery, whether it be
successful or unsuccessful.
ORDER
Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law as well as on the Stipulation and evidence proffered by the
parties, the court grants the defendant's Motion to Dismiss and
orders that plaintiff's Complaint be, and the same is hereby,
dismissed with prejudice pursuant to Rule 41(b) Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure, with each party to bear its own costs.
DATED this P-/-

day of March, 1990.
BY THE COURT:

P h i l i p E.ves
l i s t r i c t Court Judge
12\EK8\1022<*.593\Findings
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